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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOHNSON READY-MIX CONCRETE 
COMPANY, a corp·oration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
U N I T E D PACIFIC INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 9247 
This is an action upon an insurance policy brought 
by Johnson Ready-Mix Concrete Company, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, herein referred to as Johnson Ready-Mix, 
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against United Pacific Insurance Company, Defendant 
and Appellant, herein referred to as United Pacific. Trial 
was held in the District Court of Cache County, Utah, 
before a jury on March 7 and 8, 1960, the Honorable 
Lewis Jones, District Judge, presiding, and resulted in a 
verdict in favor of Johnson Ready-Mix for $12,250.00 
(R. 160). Prior to entry of judgment on the verdict, 
United Pacific moved the entry of judgment in accord-
ance with its Motion for Directed Verdict or, in the alter-
native, for a ne\v trial (R. 323). This appeal followed 
denial of these motions and entry of Judgment on Verdict 
on ~{arch 14, 1960 (R. 161, 172). 
United Pacific is an insurance company organized 
under the laws of the State of vVashington on ~farch 20, 
1928, and duly qualified to do business as an insurer 
within the State of Utah since ~farch 30, 1933. Johnson 
Ready-Mix is a Utah corporation engaged in the manu-
facture, distribution and sale of mixed concrete primarily 
in the area of Cache County, Utah. On ~fay 12, 1954, the 
President of Johnson Ready-l\Iix 'vas LeGrand Johnson. 
Percey Quinney was Sec~etary and Treasurer and Office 
Manager (R. 214). Mr. Quinney had si1nilar positions 
\Vith four other corporations principally o'vned by :r..Ir. 
Johnson ( R. 222). 
On ~1ay 12, 1954, there ,yas in full force and effect a 
co1nprehensive bodily injury and property dan1age lia-
bility poljry issued by United Pacific to J-ohnson Ready-
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~iix covering, among other things, the liability of John-
son Ready-Mix to persons injured as a result of the use 
of motor vehicles by employees of Johnson Ready-Mix 
Company (Ex. 1). On that date one of the employees of 
Johnson Ready-1\iix, while making a delivery of concrete, 
'vas involved in an accident in which Christian F. Blazer 
received personal injuries ultimately requiring an opera-
tion (R. 249, 256). The driver of the truck John Olsen, 
was aware of this accident (R. 261, 262). Mr. Blazer re-
porte·d the accident to Devere Taggart, a supervisory 
employee of Johnson Ready-Mix, who then interviewed 
Mr. Olsen briefly concerning it (R. 221, 270, 271). Ac-
cording to both Mr. Taggart and Mr. Quinney the acci-
cident was not brought to Mr. Quinney's attention (R. 
219, 220, 272) although he had the responsibility for 
reporting accidents to the agent of United Pacific. 
The procedure of Johnson Ready-l\iix relative to the 
reporting of accidents was detailed by Mr. Quinney. He 
testified: 
"Q. Did you, Mr. Quinney, have anything to 
do as a part of your duties as. office manager, 
anything to do with the instructions given employ-
ees as to the reporting of accidents 1 
A. Yes, I instructed them. 
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Q. And did you instruct specifically Mr. 
Taggart as to what he was to do with regard to 
accidents th~t came to his attention~ 
fice. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what instructions did you give him~ 
A. That they should be reported to the of-
Q. And I take it that would be to you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. As office manager f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you give any instructions to 1\fr. John 
Olsen the truck driver~ 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Did you give any general instructions to 
truck drivers f 
A. No, not directly. 
Q. Did you give any instructions to Mr. 
Taggart with respect to telling the drivers what 
the pTocedure was in connection with reporting 
accidents f 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you tell Mr. Taggart in 
that regard~ 
A. That if we had an accident, to report it. 
Q. In other words, the truck drivers were to 
report any accidents of which they knew to who, to 
you or to ~1r. Taggart~ 
A. vV ell, to either one as long as it got to 
the office. 
Q. I see. So they could have reported then 
to you or to Mr. Taggart, and he in turn, under 
the procedure, would have reported it to you 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that procedure in effect prior to 
May of 19541 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was in effect during the month of 
May of that year. 
A. Yes." (R. 224, 2.25). 
The general duties of Mr. Taggart were described • 
by ~Ir. Quinney as follows: 
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"Q. And did the corporation, on May twelfth 
of 1954, also employ a man by the name of Devere 
Taggart~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was his job? 
A. He was batch plant operator, and he 
overseen the operations, drivers' delivery of the 
concrete to the layers. 
Q. Did he sort of oversee the ready-nrix con-
crete end of the business~ 
A. Yes. 
:!&: * :)!: * * * 
"Q. Now were there other businesses being 
conducted by corporations in which ~1:r. LeGrand 
Johnson had an interest at that time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And just generally what other businesses 
were being conducted~ 
A. Well, there was the LeGrand Johnson 
Enterprises; that was a holding co1npany; and 
L~eGrand Johnson Corporation \Vas a nrining and 
quarrymg-
* * * * * ~ 
the other one \Yas LeGrand Johnson ·Construction 
Company. 
* * * * * * 
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"Q. Now were there other men in addition 
to Mr. Taggart that had the same type of job that 
he did with Johnson Ready ~fix Concrete Com-
pany! 
A. Not the same type of job, no. 
Q. Was he the only supervisor1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did these truck drivers, four or five, 
work under him' 
A. Yes." (R. 221-3) 
The policy provided with respect to notice of acci-
dents: 
"When an accident or an occurence takes 
place, written notice shall be given by or on behalf 
of the insured to the company or any of its auth-
orized agents as soon as practicable. Such notice 
shall contain particulars sufficient to identify the 
insured and also reasonably obtainable informaton 
respecting the time, place and circumstances of the 
accident or occurence, the names and addresses 
of the injured and of available witnesses, and in-
formation respecting applicable insurance avail-
able to the insured at the time of the accident or 
occurrence. If claim is made or suit is brought 
against the insured, the insured shall immediately 
forward to the company every demand, notice, 
sum1nons or other process received by him or his 
representative." (Ex. 1). 
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Johnson Ready-Mix admits that no notice of this 
accident was given United Pacific until after Johnson 
Ready-Mix Concrete Company receiv·ed a demand letter 
from counsel for Mr. Blazer on May 14, 1957, more than 
three years after the accident occurred (R. 196, 220, Ex. 
11). 
At the. trial of this case the ·Court submitted as issues 
of fact for determination by the jury whether Johnson 
Ready-Mix knew of the occurence of the accident and 
whether, if Johnson Ready-Mix knew of the accident, it 
reasonably appeared too trivial to require reporting to 
United Pacific (Instruction No. 2, R. 148). 
By its verdict the jury found either that Johnson 
Ready-Mix had no knowledge of the accident or that it 
appeared so trivial as to not require that notice of it he 
given United Pacific. 
STA·TE~1:ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE. COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO 'THE JURY 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER JO·HNSON READY-MIX 
HAD NOTI~CE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO ITHE JURY 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER JOHNSON READY-MIX 
HAD NOTI~CE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
There was no question concerning the fact that 
notice of the accident was not given to United Pacific 
until1nore than three years after the accident had occur-
red. It was the position of Johnson Ready-Mix that Mr. 
Taggart's knowledge of the accident was not imputable 
to it as he was a mere batch plant operator with authority 
only to mix cement, receive orders for cement and dis--
patch haulers to customers (R. 129). 
It was the position of United Pacific that notice to 
the company was shown as a matter of law and that the 
only issue for the jury was whether the accident reason-
ably appeared so trivial as to not require that notice of 
it be given to United Pacific (R. 298, 301, 308). 
Since the Court submitted the question of the knowl-
edge of Johnson Ready-Mix of the accident and since 
the jury could have found that no such knowledge existed 
and thus sustain its verdict, if it was error to submit 
that issue, then this case must be reversed and remanded 
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to the District Court of Cache County for a new trial. 
Olsen, et al., v. W arwood, et al., 123 Utah 111, 255 P. 
2d 725 (1953). 
The evidence was without conflict that Mr. Taggart 
had authority to receive notice of accidents involving 
Ready-Mix truck drivers from such truck drivers and 
relay such notice to Mr. Quinney. There also \Vas no 
conflict in the evidence that Ready-Mix truck drivers 
were instructed to report accidents to either Mr. Taggart 
or ~{r. Quinney (R. 2.24, 225). 
It is well settled that where a driver notifies one 
whose duty it is to receive reports of accidents and trans-
mit them to a supervisor, it constitutes notice to the 
insured, although such knowledge is not properly trans-
mitted. 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 137 
(Duties of Insured, Notice of Accidents, Claim or Suit, 
Section 4742). 
The leading A1nerican decision upon this question 
is Woolverton v. FideliJty and Casualty Company of 
New York, (N.Y., 1907) 82 N. E. 745. In that case it was 
held that an insured is not excused from giving notice 
of an accident merely because none of its general officers 
or dire.ctors or anyone who had the duty of adjusting 
differences between it and the insurer had lmo"Tledge 
thereof, and that, while the lmo,Yledge of the driver 
who caused the accident is not imputable to the insured, 
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yet, if he reported it to one whose duty it was in the 
ordinary and natural conduct of the business to receive 
reports of accidents and trans1nit them to the general 
superintendent, and he failed to transmit such knowledge, 
the insured is chargeable for his delay and neglect. 
In Iloffman v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 
Ltd., (Ore., 1934) 29 P. 2d 557, an accident occurred at 
The Dalles, Oregon while Plaintiff was engaged in con-
structing a theatre building and laying a cement sidewalk 
in front of it. Donaca was Plaintiff's foreman at the 
time of the accident. He had been instructed to report 
all accidents to Plaintiff or to Plaintiff's general super-
intendent immediately upon their occurrence but failed 
to do so and this accident was not report~e·d to the insurer 
until one year later. 
Plaintiff sought to excuse his late notice upon the 
ground that he had no personal knowledge of the accident 
and asserted that he was not chargeable with the kno\vl-
edge of the accident that Donaca had acquired at the 
time of its occurrence and failed to report. Quoting the 
\\T oolverton decision, the court said: 
"Where, however a master employs many 
servants and the duty of acquiring information 
of the accidents as they occurred is necessarily 
committed to servants or agents, if the acquisi-
tion of such information is an affirmative duty 
on his part., we cannot see why he is not respon-
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sible for the negligence or fault of the servants to 
whom he entrusts the duty to the same extent as 
he would be responsible for their negligence or 
misconduct in any other obligation to third 
persons ... ,, 
"While we thus hold that the Plaintiff was 
chargeable for the delay and neglect of its agents 
or servants in failing to apprise it of an accident, 
the occurrence of which they had acquired knowl-
edge or information, this principal must be con-
fined to those agents whose duty it was, either by 
express regulation of the Plaintiff or by their 
supervision and control in the natural and proper 
conduct of business over the subordinate servants 
by whom the accident had been caused, to trans-
mit such knowledge to their superiors or the 
,, 
company .... 
The Oregon court then said : 
"In the case at bar the evidence shows that 
Plaintiff was actively engaged, as a contractor, 
in constructing numerous buildings in different 
cities and transacted his business under the super-
vision of a general superintendent. That neither 
Plaintiff nor said superintendent was at The 
Dalles where this particular 'vork "'as being 
carried on. Donaca had been sent to The Dalles 
to take charge of and supervise the work of com-
pleting the building and side,valk, and he had 
been instructed to report all accidents covered 
by the policy either to Plaintiff or to the general 
superintendent. In the perforn1ance of the ,york 
he was not a mere servant but tihe man. in charge 
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who stood in the shoes of and represented the 
master. ~F'or Donaca's conduct while acting within 
the scope of his e·mployment and for his failure 
to perform his duties while so acting, Plaintiff 
was responsible to third parties so far as their 
rights were affected thereby, and as much charge-
able with the knowledge Donaca had of the hap-
p·ening of the accident as he would have been 
had he been personally present and poss.essed all 
of the knowledge that Donaca had at the time." 
A similar result was. reached in Black and Whvte 
Cab Cornpany v. New York Indemn~ty Co., (W.Va., 1929) 
150 S. E. 521, where it was held that the insurer was 
relieved fron1 liability for an accident which the cab 
company had failed to report, and that lack of knowledge 
of the accident on the part of tfue managing officers 
of the cab co·mpany did not excuse its failure since the 
driver of the cab involved in the accident had been 
instructed by his employer to report .accidents and there-
by became the company's agent to receive the informa-
tion. 
This rule is not, of cours.e, peculiar to knowledge 
of accidents or to insurance policies. 
"The law imputes to the princip·al, and 
charges him with, all notice or lmowledge relating 
to the s.ubject-matter of the agency which the 
agent acquires or obtains while acting as such 
agent and would in the scope of his authority, or, 
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according to the weight of authority, which he 
may previously have acquired and which he then 
had in mind, or which he had acquired so recently 
as to reasonably warrant the assumption that he 
still retained it. Provided, however, that such 
notice or knowledge will not be imputed: (1) 
where it is such as it is the agent's duty not to 
disclose: ( 2) where the agents relations to the 
subject-matter are so adverse as to practically 
destroy the relation of agency; and ( 3) where the 
person claiming the benefit of the notice, or those 
whom he represents, colluded with the agent to 
cheat or defraud the principal. 
"This rule does not depend, in either case, 
upon the fact that the agent has disclosed the 
knowledge or information to his principal; subject 
to the exceptions named, the la'v conclusively pre-
sumes that he has done so, and charges the prin-
cipal accordingly." Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 
Utah 214, 104 P. 2d 619 (1940), citing 2 :h!echam 
on Agency ( 2d Ed.) 1397 (Sec. 1813) . 
Because there was no issue of fact for the jury as 
to the knowledge of Johnson Ready-1\fix of the accident, 
the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing 
the jury that: 
"The final issues of fact for you to determine 
in this case become: 
1. Was any notice of the accident ever re-
ceived by the Plaintiff corporation prior to May 
1957? 
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2. Did the accident appear so trivial or 
1ninor (even though Plaintiff found out about it 
within a few days, should you so find) as to not 
require that notice of it be given to Defendant~" 
(Instruction No.2, R. 148). 
POIN'T II 
TH·E COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
In its Instruction No. 9 the Court charged : 
"Ordinarily, knowledge of an accident to a 
tea1nster is not imputed to his employer. The 
duty of the employer is to exercise ordinary dili-
gence in adopting such measures as would lead 
to knowledge on his part of the occurrence of 
the accident and if you believe in this case that 
the Plaintiff company did use reasonable care 
to learn of the accide!nt then the mere fact that 
the teamster or truck driver or other employee 
not authorized to act for the company had knowl-
edge of the accident which was not transmitted 
to a proper officer would not constitute knowl-
edge to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff's theory of this case is that 
no proper officer or agent of the Plaintiff had 
any notice of the accident whatever until a letter 
from the attorney was received ap·proximately 
three years after the accident. And in this con-
nection they contend that notice to the witness 
Olsen and notice to the witness Taggart was 
not notice to the comp·any. 
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In- this. connection, you are instructed that 
a, corp-oration. can only .receive notice through its 
officers and ~gents and there is a difference be-
tween a.mere employee and a supervising .agent or 
officer of the company. 
If the jury·.believes. that the witness Taggart 
was a supervising agent or a person authorized 
to accept notice for and on behalf .of the Plaintiff, 
then whatever notice Taggart had of the accident 
is notice to the Plaintiff. 
If, on the other hand, you find that Taggart 
was a mere batch piant op·erator with authority 
to ~ the cement, receive orders for cement and 
dispatch the haulers to the respect~ve customers 
w1th ··no: supervisory or oUher such authority or 
·power 'in the conduct of the business of the cor-
poratio·n, then notice to Taggart would not be 
notice to the Plaintiff. 
You are further charged that the witness 
Quinney was at all times an officer of the cor-
:.poration, and : any notice which you may find 
he received concer~ing the accident became notice 
to the corporation." (R. 155). 
This Instruction, requested by J olmson Ready-Mix 
(R. 12.9), is ~ot sup·ported by the evidence and, indeed, 
is ~qntr:ary to tihe undisputed testimony of the Secretary-
Treas.ure·r. and Office Manager of J olmson Ready-l\{ix, 
Mr. Quinney~ The argument made under Point I is ap-
plicable. to. this ·phase of the error contained in this 
Instruction. 
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In addition, this Instruction 1s a comm·ent on the 
evidence tending to indicate to the jury the attitude of 
the Court on the question of knowledge of the accident. 
Phrases like "the mere fact that", "mere employee" and 
"mere batch plant op·erator'' necessarily imply that the 
Court believes Mr. Taggart to have been without suffi-
cient authority to bind Johnson Ready-Mix with his 
knowledge. 
This Court in Fox v. Taylor, (Utah, 1960) 350 P. 
2d 154, said: 
"We recognize the duty of the Court under 
our law to avoid comments on the evidence; or 
which may tend to indicate an opinion as to what 
the facts are on disputed issues." 
See also Rule 51, U.R .. C.P., which exp~ressly forbids 
the trial court to "comment on the evidence in the case.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Instructions in this case, the jury could 
h~ve found its verdict upon an issue which should not 
have been submitted to it. The jury was aided in such 
a finding by the comments of the trial judge contained 
in the charge. 
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-Delayed . notice of more than three years after the 
accident is so flagrant a violation of the policy it sug-
gest that the jury decided that Johnson Ready-Mix 
did not know of the accident. 
"The importance to an indemnitor of a 
prompt and accurate report of an accident and 
of full assistance and cooperation on the part 
of the insured should not be minimized, and when 
the insured £ails in this duty the release of the 
indemnitor from liability is fully justified." Ohio 
Farmers Indemnity Company v. Charleston 
Laundry Co., (4 Cir~, 1950) 183 F. 2d 682. 
The Judgment on Verdict in this case should be 
reversed and a new trial granted if United Pacific is to 
be afforded even minimum requirements of substantial 
·justice. 
'. . 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lal\:e ·City 1, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
